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TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING:
CAMPAIGN SPEECH AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
Molly J. Walker Wilson*
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to and
contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere;
and if broadcast advertisements had no special ability to influence
elections apart from the merits of their arguments (to the extent they
make any) . . . then I suppose the majority’s premise [in Citizen’s
United] would be sound.
—Associate Justice John Paul Stevens1

INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission2 overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce3 and the portion of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission4 that restricted independent corporate expenditures, as
codified in section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA).5 Specifically, Citizens United invalidated laws forbidding
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
“electioneering communication,” political advocacy transmitted by
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication in the period leading up to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D., University of
Virginia; Ph.D., University of Virginia. Thanks to Jeanne Murray Walker and E. Daniel Larkin
for research support in the early stages of this project.
1 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 975 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 886.
3 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
5 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (“Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from
using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an
‘electioneering communication’ or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate . . . . Limits on electioneering communications were upheld in McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm’n.” (internal citations omitted)). Section 203 of BCRA, also known as the
“McCain-Feingold Act,” prevents corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
“electioneering communications,” a term that refers to advocacy transmitted by broadcast, cable,
or satellite communication where the message promotes or criticizes a candidate running for
federal office in the thirty-day period leading up to a primary and sixty-day period prior to a
general election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006).
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a federal election.6 In reporting the decision, The New York Times
called Citizens United “a sharp doctrinal shift [having] major political
and practical consequences [that would] reshape the way elections were
conducted.”7 The opinion drew immediate attention at the highest level.
President Barack Obama was highly critical of the result, calling it “a
major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies
and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in
Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”8
Some were pleased by the ruling, lauding the lifting of a ban on
corporate political spending as a victory for freedom of speech.9 An
amicus brief filed for the Chamber of Commerce stated that Austin’s
ban on corporate spending was “impossible to reconcile with basic First
Amendment principles.”10 For advocates of stricter campaign finance
regulations, the ruling was distressing. Former general counsel of the
Federal Election Commission Lawrence M. Noble worried publicly that
lobbyists would gain leverage with a simple threat aimed at lawmakers:
“We have got a million we can spend advertising for you or against
you—whichever one you want.”11 Retired Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor was tacitly critical of the ruling, responding to
questions by referencing her own (coauthored) opinion in McConnell,12
6 Section 203 of BCRA amended 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) to prohibit any “electioneering
communication,” which is defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within thirty days of a
primary or sixty days of a general election. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(3)(A)).
7 See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2010, at A1.
8 Id. So profound was President Obama’s concern that he addressed the Justices directly
during a portion of his State of the Union Address, predicting that the Court’s holding would
“open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit
in our elections.” He went on to assert that American elections might now be “bankrolled by
America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities.” See Mary Hall, State of the
Union: Obama Walking in the Footsteps of FDR, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-hall/state-of-the-union-obama_b_447056.html.
9 According to Jan Witold Baran, “[t]he greatest benefit of Citizens United is that it will
restrain Congress from flooding us with arcane, burdensome, convoluted campaign laws that
discourage political participation.” Jan W. Baran, Op-Ed., Stampede Toward Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A23. Baran is the author of the book, The Election Law Primer for
Corporations, and filed an amicus brief on behalf of Citizens United. See infra note 10.
10 See Supp. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 3, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). “Suppression has been imposed
even when candidates have directly attacked business interests and when corporations have
unique and valuable insight into the likely consequences of electing or defeating particular
candidates. Although this Court has protected the ability of corporations to discuss ‘issues,’ that
is no substitute for direct and explicit speech about candidates.” Id.
11 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A1.
12 See Posting of Adam Liptak to The Caucus, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com (Jan. 26,
2010, 14:05 EST). Justice O’Connor stated, “If you want my legal opinion, you can go read
[McConnell].” Id. Speaking at a keynote address at a Georgetown Law School conference,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677664

WILSON.31-6

8/9/2010 11:34:12 PM

2010] C A M P A I G N S P E E C H A N D C I T I Z E N S U N I T E D 2367
the decision that was struck down by Citizens United.13 Current Justice
John Paul Stevens had a less nuanced response, penning a scathing,
ninety-page dissent—asserting, among other things, that “[o]ur
lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a
democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the
potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and
national races.”14
Campaign finance jurisprudence is complex because the Court has
incrementally modified congressional legislation in a piecemeal
fashion,15 and in sometimes contradictory and perplexing ways.
Relatively speaking, the Citizens United opinion was refreshingly
simple. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reiterated several
previously established principles, namely that money is protected
speech, and campaign funding restrictions must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest.16 The opinion also reiterated the
notion that corruption and the appearance of corruption are the only
legitimate interests justifying interference with campaign spending.17
The ruling did not disturb existing regulations on direct campaign
contributions (as opposed to independent expenditures), which the
Court has upheld based on the rationale that contributions may result in
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof. Against the
backdrop of these principles, the Court directly confronted the question
of whether corporate independent campaign expenditures may be
regulated.18 The majority answered in the negative, and in doing so,
established a new rule that no “person”—even when that “person” is a
legal fiction—may be subject to independent campaign spending
restrictions.19
Justice O’Connor offered predictions about a post-Citizens United election: “I think today we can
anticipate that labor unions and trial lawyers, for instance, might have the financial means to win
one particular state judicial election. And maybe tobacco firms and energy companies have
enough to win the next one. And if both sides unleash their campaign spending monies without
restrictions, then I think mutually assured destruction is the most likely outcome.” Id.
13 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975.
14 Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 The lack of comprehensiveness may result from the Court’s practice of deciding cases on
the narrowest possible of grounds.
16 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896-900. Statutory classifications impinging upon First
Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. at
898.
17 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
18 Given the Court’s charge to address questions as narrowly as possible, significant
commentary has focused on the appropriateness of the majority’s decision to treat the issue before
the Court as a facial as opposed to an as-applied challenge. Although this is an interesting and
important question, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
19 In his scathing dissent, Justice Stevens summarizes the majority opinion this way:
First, the Court claims that Austin and McConnell have ‘banned’ corporate speech.
Second, it claims that the First Amendment precludes regulatory distinctions based on
speaker identity, including the speaker’s identity as a corporation. Third, it claims that
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The effect of Citizens United was to protect the right of
corporations, no less than individual American citizens, to fund and
distribute political advocacy. It would appear that this right is also
preserved for unions, although the opinion specifically addressed
corporations. The Citizens United holding is controversial for many
reasons, not the least of which is that it takes a hard-line approach that
unapologetically privileges speech, even while tacitly acknowledging
the potential for negative effects. For example, Justice Kennedy cites
with approval a concurrence from an earlier campaign finance case
arguing that “any ‘undue influence’ generated by a speaker’s ‘large
expenditures’ was outweighed ‘by the loss for democratic processes
resulting from the restrictions upon free and full public discussion.’”20
Almost simultaneously with the issuance of the Citizens United
opinion, Cardozo Law Review published Behavioral Decision Theory
and Implications for the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance
Jurisprudence (hereinafter Behavioral Campaigns),21 in which I applied
behavioral science to examine the effects of strategic campaign
messaging on voter behavior.22 The article highlighted empirical
findings illustrating the potential for independent spending not only to
change voters’ choices, but also to alter the manner in which they form
judgments. I argued that there is a nexus between campaign spending,
manipulative communication, and distorted (sub-optimal) voting
decisions.23 I proposed a new definition of “corruption,” which
encompasses an understanding of the vital governmental interest in
limiting campaign spending in order to minimize large-scale
coordinated efforts to manipulate voters’ choices.24 The Citizens United
opinion purports to settle a question that is far from settled—in fact,
behavioral science casts serious doubt upon the correctness of the
majority’s conclusions. I rearticulate my earlier argument here, with a
fresh sense of urgency. The majority’s reasoning in Citizens United, as
explained below, provides an additional rationale for my claim.
This Article challenges the Citizens United decision on several
grounds. First, I dispute the majority’s claim that corporate spending
does not result in “corruption.” Second, I assert that the potential for
Austin and McConnell were radical outliers in our First Amendment tradition and our
campaign finance jurisprudence. Each of these claims is wrong.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 901 (citing United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948)).
21 Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010) [hereinafter
Behavioral Campaigns].
22 By “strategic,” I mean communication that is designed to capitalize upon some identified
feature of human choice-formation. Strategic communication goes beyond straightforward
attempts at persuasion through exchange of information and ideas. See, e.g., id. at 680.
23 Id. at 679.
24 Id. at 683-84.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677664

WILSON.31-6

8/9/2010 11:34:12 PM

2010] C A M P A I G N S P E E C H A N D C I T I Z E N S U N I T E D 2369
corruption poses a real and serious threat to democratic elections and
that preventing this corruption is therefore a vital governmental interest
justifying restraints on “speech.” Finally, I adopt the majority’s free
speech priority and propose that even if the First Amendment is the only
legitimate consideration, corporate spending is harmful because it chills
speech in a manner not contemplated by the Court. My claim relies on
evidence from behavioral science and accepts all of the precepts
adopted by the majority—that corporations are persons for campaign
speech purposes,25 that corporations are entitled to strong First
Amendment protection, and that the only legitimate interest justifying
interference is corruption or the appearance of corruption.26 Without
discounting any of these suppositions, I make the case that the Court
wrongly decided Citizens United.
In doing so, I advance an
understanding of “corruption” and free speech that is enlightened by
conclusions of behavioral science on the interplay between campaign
spending and human judgment.
Before getting to the heart of the interest at stake in Citizens
United, it may prove helpful to dispense with several ancillary but
critical issues. These include how corporations are treated, how
campaign spending is treated, and relatedly, the level of analysis to
which restrictions on campaign spending are subject. Although the
analogy “money is speech” is not without controversy, the Court long
ago established the expressive function of funds.27 Because campaign
spending is viewed as a means of expressing support and
communicating ideas, this activity is granted First Amendment
protection.28 As a form of political communication, campaign spending
is subject to close examination, although there has been some question
of whether such communication is subject to strict scrutiny.29 In order
to justify interference with spending for political advocacy, the Court
must be satisfied that any proposed limitation serves an important
governmental interest and that the limitation is narrowly tailored to
effectuate that interest.30
Of course, in order to be entitled to protection under the First
25 While I accept this precept generally, I also agree with Justice Stevens’ assessment that
“the Court dramatically overstates its critique of identity-based distinctions, without ever
explaining why corporate identity demands the same treatment as individual identity.” Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 The interest of preventing the “appearance of corruption” is not directly relevant to my
claim; therefore, it is not discussed further in this Article.
27 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court noted that contribution and expenditure limitations “operate
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities” in that “[d]iscussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution.” 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
28 Id.
29 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
30 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
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Amendment, the speaker must be a “person” entitled to protection.31
The majority in Citizens United held that when it comes to campaign
spending, corporations should have the same rights as individual
citizens.32 Kennedy defended this extension of the campaign speech
right on the ground that corporations are “persons.”33 While it is true
that a variety of legal contexts have treated corporations as persons,34
corporations have a long history of being disadvantaged in the
campaign finance realm.35 Restrictions on corporate spending have
been justified on the grounds that corporations have special
characteristics and are entitled to fewer rights than natural persons,
points that Justice Stevens made during the oral arguments of Citizens
United.36 Both the scope of protection appropriate for corporate
31

The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32 “The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between
corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33 Kennedy repeatedly refers to corporations as persons in making the point that no “person”
should be deprived of the right to speak and advocate for a political candidate. Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 928-29.
34 Treatment of the corporate form as a “person” is famously attributed to a reporter’s note in
County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), in which Chief
Justice Waite was quoted prior to oral argument as stating: “The court does not wish to hear
argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of [the] opinion that it does.”
Corporations have also been treated as persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad and Warehouse Commission, 134
U.S. 418, 456-57 (1890).
35 At the federal level, the express distinction between corporate and individual political
spending on elections stretches back to 1907, when Congress passed the Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34
Stat. 864, banning all corporate contributions to candidates. The Senate Report on the legislation
observed that “[t]he evils of the use of [corporate] money in connection with political elections
are so generally recognized that the committee deems it unnecessary to make any argument in
favor of the general purpose of this measure. It is in the interest of good government and
calculated to promote purity in the selection of public officials.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at
952-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (1906)).
36 Stevens inquired, “[b]ut if there is a compelling government—can there be any case in
which there is a different treatment of corporations and individuals in your judgment?” Mr.
Olson replied, “I would not rule that out, Justice Stevens. I mean, there may be. I can’t imagine
all of the infinite varieties of potential problems that might exist, but—but we would eventually
come back to the narrow tailoring problem anyway.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf (referring to the strict scrutiny notion that the government must
have a compelling interest and must have a narrowly tailored rule that effectuates that interest).
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campaign spending and the potential for harm due to the particular
characteristics of corporations relate to the governmental interest at
stake: Preventing corruption in the context of democratic elections.
The prevention of corruption is not the only interest advanced to
justify restrictions on campaign spending, but it is the single interest
(along with a corresponding prevention of the appearance of such
corruption) consistently upheld by the Court as sufficient to justify
restrictions on campaign funding. “Quid pro quo” corruption, defined
as “the buying of political influence,” has been most persuasive; the
Court has upheld restrictions on campaign contributions under this
rationale.37 Independent expenditure limits, on the other hand, have
been struck down because they “restrict the quantity of campaign
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates,” and expenditures are
ostensibly less likely to give rise to corruption.38
Two Supreme Court cases dealing with corporate spending have
reached seemingly different results. The first is First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,39 in which the Court found unconstitutional a
Massachusetts law limiting corporations’ participation in ballot measure
campaigns. In determining that the law improperly abridged the First
Amendment right to free speech, the Court claimed that “the fact that
advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress
it.”40 However, a footnote in Bellotti read, “Congress might well be
able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent
corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence
candidate elections.”41 This footnote left the door open for a closer
look, suggesting that corporate independent expenditures potentially
could be shown to cause corruption.
Twelve years after Bellotti was decided, the Court heard Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce,42 a case in which the plaintiffs were
challenging a Michigan law that prohibited non-media corporations
from spending general treasury funds on advocacy related to state
election campaigns. The Austin Court envisioned a different brand of
corruption in elections: “[T]he corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
37 The Court first articulated its acceptance of contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo, noting
that “the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined” when large
contributions are given to secure “political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders,” as shown by the examples that surfaced after the 1972 election. 424 U.S. 1, 26-27
(1976).
38 See id. at 39.
39 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
40 Id. at 790.
41 Id. at 788 n.26.
42 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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support for the corporation’s political ideas.”43 The Austin Court upheld
spending limits for corporations and unions. The holding in Austin was
reaffirmed in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,44 a case that
challenged the constitutionality of BCRA.45 The McConnell Court
found a governmental interest in preventing “both the actual corruption
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public
confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of
corruption.”46 In McConnell, the Court held that section 323 of BCRA
“does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals,
corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence
federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders.”47 In
upholding this portion of BCRA, the McConnell Court relied on the
antidistortion interest articulated in Austin.48
I. POST-CITIZENS UNITED ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Citizens United,
explicitly rejected Austin’s distortion rationale, finding this interest
“unconvincing and insufficient.”49 Kennedy’s single-minded focus on
the potential for “chilling” speech left the precise objection to the
distortion rationale unarticulated. In fact, the Citizens United Court
declined to provide specific information about what type of rationale, if
any, would justify restrictions on campaign spending. What is clear
from the majority opinion is that the interest on the other side of the
equation—protection of speech—tipped the balance in favor of full
corporate participation.
Two related questions become important, one a question of law
and the other a question of fact. The question of law is whether there is
an articulable governmental interest of sufficient importance to compete
with the interest of corporate campaign advocacy (in the form of
campaign spending). The question of fact is whether there is adequate
evidence that corporate campaign spending threatens that governmental
interest. In the past, the Court has asserted that in the context of
43
44

Id. at 660.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010).
45 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 434,
437g, 437h, 438a. 439a, 441a, 441b, 441d, 441e, 441h, 441i, 441k, 454, 455 (2006)).
46 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 495 U.S.
197 (1982)).
47 Id. at 138.
48 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (“The McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion
interest recognized in Austin . . . .”).
49 Id. at 913.
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campaign finance, “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”50
The Court has also called campaign spending “a case where
constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal
equation;” accordingly, “there is no place for a strong presumption
against constitutionality.”51 However, in Citizens United, Kennedy
unhesitatingly applied strict scrutiny to the question of whether
Congress could restrict corporate spending, making it clear that the
current Court will require an interest that is “compelling.”52
Many argue that when a financially powerful source helps a
candidate win an election through independent spending, this action
curries favor with the candidate. Others worry that the simple threat of
corporations unleashing their resources against candidates will influence
candidates’ policy positions.53 Kennedy appears unconcerned, quoting
his own partial dissent from McConnell:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative
politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor
certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and
contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a
substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is
that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on
responsiveness.54

He concludes that “[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or
access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are
corrupt.”55 Ultimately, Kennedy seems convinced that “influence” is
tantamount to healthy political pressure and not financial control.
“Corruption” is therefore relegated to strict quid pro quo vote50
51
52

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Laws that burden political speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,” which requires the
Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
53 For example, Monica Youn of the Brennan Center at New York University articulated:
I think there’s going to be a threat of corporate funded attack ads against elected
officials who dare to stand up to corporate interests. Corporations have basically been
handed a weapon. And when you walk into a negotiation, and you know that one
person is armed and is able to use a weapon against you, they don’t have to take out
that weapon. They don’t have to even brandish it. You know that they have it.
Interview by Bill Moyers with Monica Youn, The Journal (PBS television broadcast Jan. 29,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/01292010/watch.html).
54 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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buying, in which money is literally exchanged for political influence.
This narrow characterization of corruption seems dangerous and naïve
to Justice Stevens, who points out that “[c]orruption operates along a
spectrum, and the majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo
arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences
does not accord with the theory or reality of politics.”56 Justice Stevens
is also concerned that the majority does not understand the distortion
rationale from Austin. He complains that “[t]he majority fails to
appreciate that Austin’s antidistortion rationale is itself an anticorruption
rationale . . . tied to the special concerns raised by corporations.
Understood properly, ‘antidistortion’ is simply a variant on the classic
governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on
officeholders that debilitate the democratic process.”57
Although Justice Kennedy himself does not share this view, he
acknowledges that “Congress believed that ‘differing structures and
purposes’ of corporations and unions ‘may require different forms of
regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.’”58
This congressional rationale is at the heart of Austin and is reaffirmed as
a vital interest meriting protection in McConnell.59 The majority in
Citizens United “acknowledges the validity of the interest in preventing
corruption,” but Justice Stevens protests that it is not an interest the
majority understands or protects, for “it effectively discounts the value
of that interest to zero.”60 Perhaps the majority either fails to see
adequate evidence of corruption, or it cares so deeply about First
Amendment protection that it cannot appreciate how any interest can
truly compete.
II. EVIDENCE OF FUNDING-RELATED HARM
Justice Kennedy believes that voters control the market. He argues
that “[t]he fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to
spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have
the ultimate influence over elected officials.”61 His logic is sound if—
and only if—either campaign money is spent only to convey accurate
information and honest ideas, or if money is spent to manipulate voters,
the attempts to manipulate are ineffective. Justice Kennedy’s logic
56
57
58
59

Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 903 (citing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
Id. (“[T]he Austin Court expressly declined to rely on a speech-equalization
rationale . . . and we have never understood Austin to stand for such a rationale.” (citing Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))).
60 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
61 Id. at 910.
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breaks down in the face of evidence that campaign money pays for the
strategic use of psychological tactics and evidence that voters are
swayed by such strategies. In Behavioral Campaigns, I wrote that
“psychological research and theory provide insight regarding the
potential for manipulative communication to distort vote choice.”62 For
decades, social scientists in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and
political science have conducted empirical studies and gathered
historical data in an attempt to glean what information they could about
how voters make decisions. The overwhelming evidence is that
targeted communication strategies can profoundly influence voter
decision-making.
A.

The Nature of Political Appeals

The central role of the political consultant reveals a great deal
about the nature of campaign communication.63 As is true in other
“markets,” polling research and campaign strategists dominate the
political landscape.64 Political consultants are extremely costly, yet
candidates consistently demonstrate a willingness to commit campaign
funds to retain these professionals.65 The logic is clear: Political
consultants supply a critical knowledge of the cognitive mechanisms
that have been successfully exploited by marketing strategists in other
forums.66 Campaign communication is the product of careful strategic
planning and road testing. Information is reduced to “sound bites” and
is framed and disseminated in such a fashion so as to maximize impact.
Events external to the political race are harnessed or downplayed,
depending upon the predicted impact on public opinion of a candidate
or issue. As has been noted, “[p]olitics and campaigns are structured
around how, where, and to whom a candidate or issue should be
presented.”67 Political strategy is exceptionally costly.68 However, the
62
63

Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at 687.
See CAMPAIGN WARRIORS: POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN ELECTIONS 2 (James A. Thurber
& Candice J. Nelson eds., 2000) (discussing the importance of consultants for political
campaigns).
64 See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON’T PANDER:
POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (2000) (describing
the considerable resources invested in crafting persuasive messages).
65 See LARRY J. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING
ELECTIONS 49-53 (1981).
66 See Mary J. Culnan & Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy Issues and the Creation of Campaign
Mailing Lists, 11 INFO. SOC’Y 2, 85-87 (1995).
67 Id. (discussing the importance of the use of experts in product development and advertising
for political campaigning).
68 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
663, 684 (1997) (“Where does all this political money go? The biggest expense is the cost of
purchasing advertising time on television (though increasingly, political consultants take a hefty
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value of effective techniques is indisputable.69
B.

Psychological Impacts

Voters, like decisionmakers in other contexts, must make choices
with limited information and under time constraints. An inability to
collect, sort, and analyze all relevant data leads voters to rely on
cognitive and informational shortcuts, or heuristics, which allow voters
to “keep the information processing demands of the task within
bounds.”70 Individuals often also rely on social sources for both facts
and opinions.71 As a result, voters rely on imperfect and incomplete
information and tend to process that information haphazardly, leaving
them vulnerable to manipulation by politically motivated actors. A vote
based upon incomplete information can be considered “accurate.” The
test is whether the vote cast is the same vote that would have been cast
if complete information had been available. To the extent that a
citizen’s reliance on erroneous or misleading information and cognitive
shortcuts results in a vote that is different from that which he or she
would have cast with full information, the voter is deemed not fully
competent, and the vote is “incorrect.”72
In summary, voters hold “inaccurate and stereotyped factual
beliefs,” and they hold these beliefs “overconfidently [and] resist
correct information, prefer easy arguments, interpret elite statements
according to racial or other biases, and rely heavily on scanty
information about a candidate’s policy positions.”73 A closer look at
some of the specific cognitive traps relevant to voter decision-making
can provide a glimpse into the potential for psychological manipulation.
share).”); see also Linda L. Fowler, The Best Congress Money Can Buy?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 417,
420 (2007) (discussing the rising costs of campaigning and the prominent role of consultants in
crafting election communications).
69 See James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition,
Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 153, 181-82 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (“We have cautioned
against overly optimistic accounts of a politically competent, rational public. Not only are
citizens minimally informed, as nearly all scholars agree, but they are also prone to bias and error
in using the limited information they receive.”).
70 See Robert P. Abelson & Ariel Levi, Decision Making and Decision Theory, in 1(3) THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231-309 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985).
71 See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON.
99 (1955) (for the proposition that decision-makers use shortcuts); see also BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing empirical investigations of how human beings process
information and make choices).
72 See Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 69, at 156-57 (finding that the voting public is error
prone); Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive
Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 966 (2001).
73 See Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 69, at 156.
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For example, individuals can be manipulated by framing, availability,
and emotional appeals. These three areas are a small subset of a larger
constellation of relevant cognitive and behavioral phenomena that can
result in suboptimal decision-making.
1.

Framing

A simple change in how choices are presented, or “framed,” can
influence a decision-maker’s preference for one option over another.74
In the framing context, syntax is a tool employed by clever
communicators to craft listeners’ perceptions. In fact, the potential for
strategic use of this cognitive trick has been cited as a hallmark
characteristic of framing.75 So powerful is the effect of the strategic use
of frames that some have cautioned framing strategies “can become
freewheeling exercises in pure manipulation.”76 Political scientists and
historians have linked issue framing to successful attempts at shaping
public support for everything from a particular political party77 to a
specific military engagement.78
One of the most common types of framing used to persuade the
public to endorse a candidate or issue is “valence framing,” which
occurs when options are (misleadingly) depicted as diametrically
opposed; one option is promoted as advantageous, while the other is
intolerable.79 Another common tactic is to pair words or phrases that
have certain established meanings with other concepts in order to create
new understandings and associations. A prime example is “clean coal.”
74 See Eldar Shafir, Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological Perspective, 13
POL. PSYCHOL. 311, 313-14 (1992) (“Framing refers to the tendency of normatively
inconsequential changes in the formulation of a choice problem to affect the ways people
represent the problem and, consequently, their preferences.”); see also generally, Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453
(1981). The effects of framing can be seen when two “logically equivalent (but not transparently
equivalent) statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options.” Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 36 (1998).
75 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 313, 317 (2006) (calling framing “the ability of someone who is propounding an option to
present the option . . . in such a way as to . . . make the option seem more or less desirable”).
76 See Donald R. Kinder & Don Herzog, Democratic Discussion, in RECONSIDERING THE
DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 347, 363 (George E. Marcus & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1993).
77 For an account of the framing effect at work in a presidential election, see Matt Bai, The
Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 17, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/07/17/magazine/17DEMOCRATS.html.
78 See JEFFREY FELDMAN, FRAMING THE DEBATE: FAMOUS PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES AND
HOW PROGRESSIVES CAN USE THEM TO CHANGE THE CONVERSATION (AND WIN ELECTIONS)
(2007) (discussing George W. Bush’s reference to “axis of evil” in speeches).
79 See Irwin P. Levin, Sandra L. Schneider, & Gary J. Gaeth, All Frames Are Not Created
Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGL. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 149, 150 (1998).
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In other instances, framing is achieved by altering the presentation of
numbers or percentages. For instance, an advertising campaign might
refer to a product as ninety-nine percent pure, as opposed to one percent
impure.80 Responses to framing changes are so robust in human beings
that some researchers have looked at the physiological basis for these
responses and have discovered that the framing effect is associated with
the amygdale, an area of the brain responsible for processing
emotions.81
2.

The Availability Heuristic

Ideas, events, and characterizations that are easily brought to mind
are said to be “available.” Empirical investigations of the availability
heuristic reveal that subjects change their estimates about the likelihood
of a danger materializing based upon the recency, frequency, and
vividness of information about the danger.82 In particular, the perceived
likelihood of events—particularly risky events or bad outcomes—
increases if the language used to describe these dangers is emotionally
loaded.83 For example, prior to the terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, Americans ranked terrorism low on their
list of priorities meriting governmental attention.84 More than a year
after the attack of September 11, public polls indicated that Americans
deemed the threat of terrorism to be the single most important problem
facing the United States. Even more interestingly, “fluctuations [in
Americans’ concern about terrorism] closely track[ed] the frequency of
television news stories concerning terrorism.”85
Campaign tactics often involve efforts to increase the cognitive
availability of ideas that are advantageous to the candidate. For
example, advertising campaigns develop themes and use repetition to
80 The classic slogan of Ivory Soap was “99 44/100 Per Cent. Pure.” A 1907 advertisement
using this slogan can be viewed at http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/archives/
Ivory/detail.asp?index=0207910005.jpg&startCount=5&skipNo=yes&skip_num=1&key=&subje
ct=&output=text&dates=&coll=&form_genre=.
81 Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the Human
Brain, 313 SCIENCE 684 (2006).
82 See Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental
Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2149
(2009) (“The availability heuristic is a widely-used mental shortcut that leads people to assign a
higher likelihood to events that are readily ‘available’—events that are particularly likely to come
to mind due to their vividness, recency, or frequency.”).
83 Id.
84 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 532 (2007) (“[O]n September 10, 2001, terrorism was far
from a high priority item for Americans—and . . . the year before the attacks, literally 0% of the
public counted terrorism as the nation’s leading problem!”).
85 See id. (internal citations omitted).
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build a particular understanding of an issue.86 Campaign funds are first
spent developing and testing advertisements that communicate simple
messages in memorable ways. Funds are then used to distribute the
communication widely, preferably in a variety of formats. Political
psychologists have noted the effectiveness of such a strategy, finding
that “information that is widely and repeatedly disseminated to the
public stands a good chance of being absorbed (and retrieved later).”87
3.

The Role of Emotions

Emotional appeals are a hallmark of political campaigns.88
Negative emotions such as fear, anger, and outrage are particularly
prominent in political advertising, primarily because these emotions
tend to influence choice.89 In the political marketplace, “negative”
campaigning is commonplace, making this type of political
communication one of the most prominent examples of an effort to
harness the power of emotions.90 Political advertisements are
particularly infamous for triggering fear in constituents. One prominent
example is the 1964 Lyndon B. Johnson advertisement entitled “Peace,
Little Girl,” in which the reflection of an atomic mushroom cloud was
portrayed as a reflection in the eyes of a small child.91 Because lawmakers have control over the exposure of citizens to various risks, the
role of emotions in perceptions about risk becomes a central feature of
political choice.92 As Dan Kahan notes:
86 See Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay Under the “Magic
Words” Doctrine?, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 37 (1998). For further scholarship on
informational and reputational cascades, see Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 708-09 (1999).
87 Daron R. Shaw, A Study of Presidential Campaign Event Effects from 1952 to 1992, 61 J.
POL. 387, 393 (1999).
88 See generally TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL
APPEALS IN POLITICAL ADS WORK (2006).
89 See Mary Frances Luce, Choosing to Avoid: Coping with Negatively Emotion-Laden
Consumer Decisions, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 409 (1998).
90 See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995); see also Lynda Lee Kaid &
Anne Johnston, Negative Versus Positive Television Advertising in U.S. Presidential Campaigns,
1960-1988, 41 J. COMM. 53, 53 (1991); see also generally Thomas J. Rudolph, Amy Gangl, &
Dan Stevens, The Effects of Efficacy and Emotions on Campaign Involvement, 62 J. POL. 1189
(2000) (noting that negative emotions can influence political involvement); Chris Weber,
Exploring the Role of Discrete Emotions in Political Campaigns, available at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/8/8/5/pages208851/p208851
-1.php.
91 This advertisement can be viewed at: http://www.history.com/videos/campaign-spot-peacelittle-girl-1964#campaign-spot-peace-little-girl-1964 (last visited June 25, 2010).
92 See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
741, 744-45 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Much of the current work in this area is based upon that
of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, who were pioneers in the movement to use emotion and
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Distinct emotional states—from fear to dread to anger to disgust—
and distinct emotional phenomena—from affective orientations to
symbolic associations and imagery—have been found to explain
perceptions of the dangerousness of all manner of activities and
things—from pesticides to mobile phones, from red meat
consumption to cigarette smoking.93

While triggering fear in connection with specific political
candidates may prove to be an effective political strategy, it is likely to
result in suboptimal voter decisions by distorting or skewing voter
perceptions.94
III. THE CASE FOR AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
A.

The Special Nature of Corporations

Without question, political candidates already exploit various
features of human judgment and choice.95 However, candidate
spending is different from corporate spending in a number of important
ways. First, the politician is directly answerable to the electorate for his
or her political campaign communication because candidates are
required to explicitly identify their sponsorship of an advertisement. If
the public objects to a candidate’s campaign message, voters can clearly
identify the source of the message and can take whatever action they
deem appropriate by expressing objections publicly or withholding
financial and other support. Second, due to the cap on contributions, the
financial wherewithal of a candidate bears at least some relationship to
his or her popularity.96 Third, a candidate’s spending is tied to the
candidate’s ability to communicate positions and policy preferences to
the American public. 97
culture to explain responses to risk and decision-making more generally. See, e.g., MARY
DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY (1992); MARY DOUGLAS &
AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by
Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 4
(1987).
93 See Kahan, supra note 92, at 744-45.
94 See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION,
AND DEMOCRACY (1992).
95 See Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at Section I.D (discussing historical examples
of the use of psychological tactics during political campaigns).
96 In Behavioral Campaigns, I argue that there are reasons to be concerned about unchecked
spending, even if the spending is on the part of the candidate or political party. Behavioral
Campaigns, supra note 21. However, the same social science based arguments pertaining to
unchecked spending apply with more force when the spending is “under the table”—as is current
independent spending—where there is virtually no accountability for the message. Id.
97 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court stated that “it is of particular importance that candidates
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While independent spending by corporations and unions may
superficially appear to be similar to candidate spending, it lacks many
of the safeguards that exist in the case of candidate spending. After
Citizens United, candidates who are particularly pro-corporation or proIndustry X will likely enjoy a considerable financial advantage over
other candidates and the advantage will be unrelated to public support
for that candidate. Moreover, as empirical research has demonstrated,
corporate financial muscle may in fact alter public preferences. After
all, successful corporations are experts when it comes to investing
capital in a way that achieves maximum effectiveness.98
Corporations differ not only from candidates, but also from
wealthy individuals. While some individual citizens have tremendous
financial resources to spend on political advocacy, they lack the special
legal identity of the corporation. Moreover, their interests are more
diverse and are driven—at least in part—by human rather than business
concerns.99 The special purpose and legal protections granted
corporations raise particular concerns in the political sphere. It is
therefore difficult to understand Justice Kennedy’s claim that “by taking
the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government
deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to
strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s
voice.”100 Similarly perplexing is the majority’s assertion that it finds
“no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”101
It is difficult to conceive of a way in which corporations can be
characterized as “disadvantaged” or “disfavored.” In fact, corporations
enjoy numerous benefits that are not available to other persons. As the
have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently
evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before
choosing among them on election day.” 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976). There is no concomitant need
for a corporation to communicate its views to the electorate in order for citizens to understand
candidates’ positions on issues.
98 See Brief for Am. Indep. Bus. Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 3,
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205) (“The governance system of such
corporations is highly successful for the pursuit of profit . . . .”) (on file with Cardozo Law
Review).
99 Hence, while corporations have a certain, specific, narrow set of concerns related to
productivity and profits, wealthy individuals my be philanthropic, humanitarian, proenvironment, pro-arts, or religious—values that corporations and unions are unlikely to espouse
through support for political candidates.
100 There are other issues germane to the treatment of corporations. Justice Stevens points out
that if “the identity of a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate political
speech, [it] would lead to some remarkable conclusions, [for example] it would appear to afford
the same protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual
Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could ‘enhance the relative voice’ of some (i.e., humans)
over others (i.e., nonhumans).” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947-48 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49).
101 Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
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Austin majority pointed out, “[s]tate law grants corporations special
advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.”102 Not only
do corporations enjoy special treatment, but the corporation also must
aim “to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter how
persuasive the arguments for a broader or conflicting set of
priorities.”103
Without doubt, the financial power of large corporations is
breathtaking. To provide some context: The total amount spent on all
federal elections in the 2008 election cycle was just shy of $5.3 billion
(for congressional and presidential races combined).104 Over roughly
the same time period (2007-08), the profits for Exxon totaled $85
billion.105 This means that in just two years, a single—albeit very
large—corporation with clear policy preferences earns profits in excess
of sixteen times the total expenditures of all federal elections for a
single election cycle. In an Op-Ed published by the Washington Post,
Senator Russ Feingold wrote, “[the Citizens United] decision gives a
green light to corporations to unleash their massive coffers on the
political system. The profits of Fortune 500 companies in 2008 alone
were 350 times the entire amount spent on the last presidential
election.”106 As one commentator has remarked, “[this] illustrates how
easy it will be for one company, one industry, or the corporate class
overall, to dominate the electoral discourse in the wake of Citizens
United.”107

102 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Justice Stevens foresees a special potential for corporate
dominance because corporations “are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not
simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and organizational structure.
Remove all restrictions on their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a type of rent
seeking that is ‘far more destructive’ than what noncorporations are capable of. It is for reasons
such as these that our campaign finance jurisprudence has long appreciated that ‘the ‘differing
structures and purposes’ of different entities ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to
protect the integrity of the electoral process.’” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (internal
citations omitted)).
103 Brief for Am. Indep. Bus. Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee on Supp.
Question at 11, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).
104 The Money Behind the Elections, OpenSecrets.org: Center for Responsive Politics,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php (last visited June 25, 2010).
105 Steve Hargreaves, Exxon 2008 Profit: A Record $45 Billion, CNNMoney.com, Jan. 30,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/30/news/companies/exxon_earnings/index.htm (last visited
June 25, 2010).
106 Russ Feingold, Op-Ed., Democracy Hurt by Citizens United Decision, WASH. POST, Jan.
24, 2010, available at http://feingold.senate.gov/opinion/10/20100124.htm.
107 Robert Weissman, A Disadvantaged Class? The Corporate Speech Index,
CommonDreams.org, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/12-8 (last
visited June 25, 2010).
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B.

A Fresh Look at Corruption

The Court’s history of focusing on prevention of corruption or
appearance of corruption as the only legitimate state interests justifying
campaign funding regulation should elicit a thorough examination of the
definition of corruption. “Corruption” is in the eye of the beholder, and
many varied and nuanced definitions of corruption have been offered.
In the earlier Behavioral Campaigns article, I argued for a new
conceptualization of “corruption,” applying social science research and
theory to reveal the potential for campaign communication to
manipulate—rather than inform—the electorate. I noted:
Political advertising and other forms of propaganda are entrenched
and vital aspects of the American political process, and political
candidates inevitably tout their experience, promote their policies,
and attack their opponents. However, while vigorous debate and
self-promotion are vital elements of the American political process,
temperance and egalitarianism are crucial as well. In order for a
government to operationalize democratic principles, it must place
reasonable constraints upon a variety of institutions . . . that might
otherwise undermine objectives of self-governance.108

In articulating an appropriate place for governmental oversight in
this area, it may be instructive to consider the role of courts in contract
law. Just as parties to a contract must understand the terms and enter
freely into the agreement, there should be at least a modicum of
protection for citizens who are shopping for a political candidate
empowered to create laws that profoundly affect those citizens. After
all, “[t]he legitimacy of a government rests upon the inclusion and
informed consent of its members of society.”109
Ironically, in advancing his anti-regulation position, Justice
Kennedy lays claim to the informed public argument. Kennedy takes a
page from Buckley, asserting that “[i]n a republic where the people are
sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential.” This claim has rhetorical power
because few would contest it. However, Justice Kennedy’s reliance on
the informed citizenry rationale ignores the fact that proponents of
corporation spending restrictions have precisely the same concern. Like
Justice Kennedy, advocates of reasonable corporate restraints are
concerned about vesting ultimate power over elections to the people.110
108
109

Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at 742.
See J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government ii, 4; viii, 95, reprinted in READINGS IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 530, 551 (Francis W. Coker ed., 1938).
110 Admittedly, pro-restraint advocates are less concerned about protecting corporations than
the Citizens United majority.
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Hence, this is not a dispute concerning the value of democratic elections
or whether the American citizenry should be free to choose their
representatives. Instead, the controversy lies in how to best create and
maintain a political environment that maximizes the ability of the
citizenry to make informed decisions.
In order to maintain a knowledgeable electorate, it is vital to
examine social science data illustrating the potential for strategic
communication to influence citizens to vote against their self interest.111
The data suggests that political communication can frustrate voter
understanding. This evidence should be in the record before the Court
and should be given careful attention. After considering the empirical
evidence, the Court may find that under some circumstances,
countervailing
forces
adequately
neutralize
manipulative
communication. Campaign discourse and debate may reveal
misleading, biased, or skewed information. Even when the bulk of
resources favor a particular candidate, alternative perspectives and a
range of opposing interests may adequately protect voters from the most
egregious forms of hoodwinking.112
Unfortunately, however, the majority in Citizens United does not
appear to have conducted an analysis of the realities of independent
spending advocacy, and the implications of opening the door to
corporate involvement in this activity. Justice Stevens writes:
The Court’s facile depiction of corporate electioneering assumes
away all of these complexities. Our colleagues ridicule the idea of
regulating expenditures based on ‘nothing more’ than a fear that
corporations have a special ‘ability to persuade,’ as if corporations
were our society’s ablest debaters and viewpoint-neutral laws such as
§ 203 were created to suppress their best arguments. In their haste to
knock down yet another straw man, our colleagues simply ignore the
fundamental concerns of the Austin Court and the legislatures that
have passed laws like § 203: to safeguard the integrity,
competitiveness, and democratic responsiveness of the electoral
process.113

In light of the growing mountain of evidence that voters can be and are
misled, misinformed, and misdirected by certain types of prevalent
communication, it behooves the Court to listen to Congress and to think
carefully about what it is unleashing on the American public in the

111 To the degree that a voter’s reliance on limited information and cognitive heuristics results
in a vote that is different from that which he or she would have cast with full information, the
voter is not competent, and the vote is “incorrect.” Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 72, at 966 (“In
fact, heavy reliance on political heuristics actually made decision making less accurate among
those low in political sophistication.”).
112 The Court has held that equalizing speech opportunities is not an interest that is sufficient
to merit restraints on political speech.
113 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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name of “informed” decision-making.
C.

Speech Concerns

Although Justice Kennedy argued briefly that “independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption,”114 he spent most of his
opinion extolling the virtues of unencumbered speech. The Citizens
United majority opinion left open the question of what type of interest
might ever give rise to constitutionally defensible limitations.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the right of free speech is not inviolate.
After all, speech is limited in any number of circumstances where a
compelling governmental interest has been shown.115 Perhaps in spite
of the empirical evidence, the majority will remain unconvinced that
these cognitive and behavioral patterns are present in the voting context
and that funding influences them. Alternatively, the majority might
believe that protecting speech is so important that no other rationale
would justify campaign spending limits. This still leaves the possibility
that the Citizens United majority would allow restrictions on the
political speech of some, if and only if such an imposition was necessary
to protect the First Amendment right of others. Assuming without
deciding that only the most narrow of rationale will suffice, we are left
with a question of fact: Does lifting the corporate expenditure restriction
for electioneering communications threaten the right of free speech for
non-corporate citizens?
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy writes that voters are adults
who “must be free to obtain information from diverse sources . . . .”116
This implicates two assumptions. The first assumption is that
corporations are “diverse;” the second is that restricting corporate
political speech is harmful to the recipient of the speech. With respect
to the issue of corporate diversity, clearly there are aspects of
114
115

Id. at 909.
In fact, Justice Kennedy’s opinion lists cases in which the Court has upheld restraints on
speech where it found a compelling governmental rationale. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (protecting the “function of public school education”); Jones
v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974)) (furthering “the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (quoting United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344
(1971)) (ensuring “the capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities”).
Not to be outdone, Justice Stevens also points out that the government “routinely places special
restrictions on the speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners,
and its own employees. When such restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental
interest, they do not necessarily raise constitutional problems.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
116 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
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corporations that are diverse. They vary in size, in resources, and in
what they produce. However, it is not their diversity that has caused
lawmakers at the state and federal level to repeatedly pass legislation to
regulate their political spending, nor is it their varied character that
persuaded the majority in Austin and again in McConnell to uphold
these regulations. Rather, it is the particular features common to
corporations that cause unease. Concerns include the fact that
corporations exist for the singular purpose of generating revenue, and
they do not have values and ideals. Corporations lack compassion and
the desire to protect and nurture today’s world for the benefit of future
generations.117 In addition, corporations enjoy special protections not
shared by individual members of society, as mentioned above.118
The second implication of Justice Kennedy’s quote, and a theme of
the majority opinion, is that the threatened right belongs not only (and
perhaps not primarily) to corporations, but also to voting adults who
otherwise would be “free to obtain”119 information from corporations.
In this vision of the voter, he or she actively seeks information from
corporations and suffers when regulations interfere with these efforts.
Justice Kennedy is relying on a dual-protection notion of the First
Amendment right of free speech: The right of the speaker to express
views and to be heard, and the right of the recipient to gain access to the
speakers’ communication. Justice Kennedy’s rationale in Citizens
United is based in large part on protecting the recipients of political
advocacy. Other members of the majority in Citizens United have
expressed similar concern for protecting recipients of campaign
speech.120
While some have characterized the Citizens United opinion as a
debate between a pro-corporate majority and an anti-corporate dissent,
this is an unfair characterization of both sides. In fact, much of the
dispute centers on how best to protect the public. Justice Kennedy
writes: “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened selfgovernment and a necessary means to protect it.”121 Justice Stevens
counters: “The Court’s blinkered and aphoristic approach to the First
117 Individual citizens who own, manage, and are employed by corporations do possess these
qualities, but they are free to spend without restriction.
118 See supra Part III.A.
119 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (emphasis added).
120 Scalia, who voted with the majority, expressed a similar concern for protecting the
recipient of communication when, during oral argument, he asked, “Mr. Stewart, do you think
that there’s a possibility that the First Amendment interest is greater when what the government is
trying to stifle is not just a speaker who wants to say something but also a hearer who wants to
hear what the speaker has to say?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876 (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/08-205.pdf.
121 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
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Amendment may well promote corporate power at the cost of the
individual and collective self-expression the Amendment was meant to
serve.”122 Justice Kennedy retorts that, in the words of Stanley Fish,
voters “are not to be schooled by a government that would protect them
from sources it distrusts.”123 Justice Stevens’ rejects the majority’s
notion that it is impossible to have too much speech, classifying the
majority’s viewpoint as a “proposition with undeniable surface appeal
but little grounding in evidence or experience,” because “[i]n the real
world, we have seen, corporate domination of the airwaves prior to an
election may decrease the average listener’s exposure to relevant
viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens’ willingness and capacity to
participate in the democratic process.”124
The Justices who make up the Citizens United majority have the
power and the purpose to shape campaign funding in monumental ways
over the next several decades. Their belief that unfettered corporate
campaign speech benefits the electorate will drive future campaign
finance Court decisions. The accuracy of this supposition is amenable
to empirical analysis. Careful questions should be asked about the
effects of speech on the recipients in light of available data.125 If more
speech consistently results in a greater variety of viewpoints and
increased access to accurate information and honest debate, the interests
of listeners are best served by fewer restrictions on speech. If, however,
Stevens is correct that “flooding the airwaves with slogans and soundbites may well do more to obscure the issues than to enlighten
listeners,”126 and if financial giants with deep pockets and interests of
limited value to the public at large127 will interfere with the public’s
ability to hear all viewpoints and get accurate information, then
restrictions might well be appropriate.
Citizens United might also interfere with speech by privileging
122 Id. at 977 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Commentator Stanley Fish characterizes Stevens’
concern this way: “Stevens is worried—no, he is certain—that the form of speech Kennedy
celebrates will corrupt the free flow of information so crucial to the health of a democratic
society.” Posting of Stanley Fish to Opinionator, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com (Feb. 1,
2010, 19:30 EST) [hereinafter Posting of Stanley Fish].
123 Posting of Stanley Fish, supra note 108 (interpreting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899
(“[I]t is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain
information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.”)).
124 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 “The majority seems oblivious to the simple truth that laws such as § 203 do not merely pit
the anticorruption interest against the First Amendment, but also pit competing First Amendment
values against each other.” Id. at 976 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
127 “Existing rules already give corporations the ability to speak on the issues that matter to
them. Thus, the primary effect of overruling Austin or McConnell would be to promote political
rent-seeking, not genuine expression of ideas.” Supp. Brief for Comm. for Econ. Dev. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellee, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).
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certain types of speech at the expense of other types of speech. If some
voices speak so “loudly” that others are effectively rendered silent, this
should trouble a majority obsessed with preventing the “chill” of
political speech.128 Large corporations have the financial advantage
necessary to gain a competitive edge over other voices in the months
leading up to an election.129 The Austin Court’s unease with “corporate
domination” of political elections relates to the goal of safeguarding
First Amendment values by preserving some space in the political
“marketplace.” The numerous advantages enjoyed by corporations “not
only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s
economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the
economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.’”130
Empirical evidence provides support for this aspect of the prospeech rationale. The resources spent on advocacy do more to create
vast quantities of speech; a substantial portion of funding goes directly
to developing communication that obscures and disables conflicting
messages. Evidence that voters rely heavily on cognitive shortcuts
suggests that they only actually consider a subset of all relevant
speech.131 The most influential communication is most likely
characterized as crafty rhetoric and strategically targeted messages. As
one scholar has noted, “the tendency of voters to rely on less than
perfect information and to process that information in a relatively
cursory way means that the decision-making process is particularly
vulnerable to manipulation . . . .”132 As a result, “[c]orporate wealth can
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of
independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of
political contributions.”133

128 The notion that certain types of particularly manipulative speech can interfere with other
speech is different from the idea that all voices should have access to precisely the same
resources. Concerns about the special character and advantages of corporations should not be
confused with a general equalizing rationale, which was rejected in Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
129 That corporations can overwhelm other speakers is of particular concern if one agrees with
the premise that “within the realm of [campaign spending] generally,” corporate spending is
“furthest from the core of political expression . . . .” FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8
(2003).
130 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986)).
131 See Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections, 40
AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996); Thomas E. Nelson & Zoe M. Oxley, Issue Framing Effects on Belief
Importance and Opinion, 61 J. POL. 1040 (1999); Thomas E. Nelson et al., Toward a Psychology
of Framing Effects, 19 POL. BEHAV. 221, 226 (1997).
132 Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at 689.
133 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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Small Corporations Are Not the Panacea
to Political Campaign Ills

Justice Kennedy argued that lifting the ban on corporate spending
would give small corporations the power to push back against large
corporate interests. He asserted that “when [lobbying] is coupled with
§ 441b, the result is that smaller or nonprofit corporations cannot raise a
voice to object when other corporations, including those with vast
wealth, are cooperating with the Government.”134 Without question,
large corporations lobby elected officials tirelessly.135 Small
corporations lack the financial wherewithal and political connections to
exert the same kind of pressure. It is difficult to see how supplying an
additional way for corporations to gain an advantage by spending
money will give small corporations more power vis-à-vis large
corporations. Opening the door for an additional avenue to exert
influence over politics—which, like lobbying, selectively favors the
most prosperous corporations—is likely to do just the opposite.
Importantly, while the prevalence of the small business in the
United States makes this type of enterprise important and deserving of
protection, it does not make it financially or politically powerful.
During the Citizens United oral argument, Justice Ginsburg made the
point that while ninety-seven percent of corporations in the United
States are small businesses, small businesses do not correspondingly
contribute ninety-seven percent of the existent corporate campaign
spending. In the reargument of Citizens United, Justice Ginsburg noted
that the expenditures that “count are the ones from the corporations that
can amass these huge sums in their treasuries.”136 Even if small
corporations can afford to devote resources to create campaign
messages, they will lack sufficient funds for the strategy groundwork. It
would be an unusual “mom-and-pop” business that could afford to pay
for consultants, marketing research, and broadcasting.
This leads to the primary concern: Large corporations often have
specific agendas of questionable public value, tremendous resources
with which to craft and deliver their messages, and a lack of opponents
with similar political clout and financial resources. Without credible
opposition to reveal their machinations and launch counterattacks, large
corporations operate unchecked. Large corporate interests include, inter
alia, less stringent environmental protection laws, caps on products
134
135

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010).
Brief for State of Montana et al. as Amici Curiae Addressing June 29, 2009 Order for
Supp. Briefing and Supporting Neither Party at 19, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).
136 Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205[Reargued].pdf.
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liability awards, tax breaks for businesses, and fewer employee
protection laws. To the extent that small businesses do not share those
goals with big businesses (in spite of membership in a common
industry), they are unlikely to be able to launch an effective propaganda
effort to counteract those of large corporations. Small corporations are
relatively powerless against large corporations not only because they are
at a significant disadvantage financially, but also because they face
various obstacles to effectively organizing and consolidating resources
to achieve a common goal. The position of the small business in
politics is somewhat similar to that of the individual voter, because
“[w]hen large numbers of citizens have a common stake in a measure
that is under consideration, it may be very difficult for them to
coordinate resources on behalf of their position.”137
CONCLUSION
In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt wrote, “[a]ll contributions by
corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose
should be forbidden by law.”138 The American public appears to share
this sentiment. In a recent poll, an overwhelming majority of
respondents indicated approval of restrictions on spending for
corporations and unions.139 These same respondents place a higher
priority on regulating corporate and union spending than on protecting
the right to free speech.140 In contrast to the Citizens United majority,
the American public supports limitations on free speech in the interest
of combating dangers posed by unchecked corporate election spending.
Rather than wanting to “be free to obtain information” from
corporations, the public appears to be deeply distrustful of specific
sources of communication—so much so that voters would prefer

137
138
139

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957).
One poll revealed that “Americans of both parties overwhelmingly oppose a Supreme
Court ruling that allows corporations and unions to spend as much as they want on political
campaigns . . . . Eight in ten poll respondents say they oppose the high court’s Jan. 21 decision to
allow unfettered corporate political spending, with sixty-five percent ‘strongly’ opposed. Nearly
as many backed congressional action to curb the ruling, with seventy-two percent in favor of
reinstating limits.” Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on
Campaign Financing, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html. Another poll revealed that sixty-one
percent of Americans think the government should be able to limit the amount of money
individuals can contribute to candidates, while seventy-six percent think the government should
be able to limit the amount corporations or unions can give.” Lydia Saad, Public Agrees With
Court: Campaign Money is “Free Speech,” GALLUP, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/125333/Public-Agrees-Court-Campaign-Money-Free-Speech.aspx?CSTS=alert).
140 Saad, supra note 139.
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governmental interference.141 Citizens may perceive that they already
are exposed to much of the corporate speech that is specifically
protected and promoted by Citizens United, and they may want less, not
more of this type of communication.142
Some congressional leaders seem to understand the public
sentiment and are moving quickly to limit the impact of Citizens
United.143 On February 11, 2010, Senator Charles E. Schumer of New
York and Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland introduced a
bill that would increase disclosure requirements and compel companies
to inform shareholders about political spending, requiring corporate
chief executives to appear in any political advertising funded by their
companies.144 Lawmakers would also ban companies with more than
twenty percent foreign ownership from participating in U.S. elections.
The bill would exclude government contractors and bank bailout
recipients as well as corporations having a board of directors with a
majority of foreign nationals. Additionally, the new law would require
corporations to set up political funding accounts and to report political
spending to the FEC.145
Whether voters are informed or misinformed depends largely upon
how they get their information and from what types of sources. When
information originates from a variety of sources, and when the
communication represents a range of interests and perspectives, voters
141 A poll taken after the Citizens United opinion asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the
Supreme Court’s decision that allows corporations to spend on behalf of candidates in elections?”
Respondents indicated general disapproval of the decision: seventeen percent approved, sixtyeight percent disapproved, and fifteen percent were unsure. Even the group most supportive of
the decision—the Republicans—were overwhelmingly against corporate spending: twenty-two
percent in favor and sixty-five percent against. Pew Research Center Poll,
http://www.pollingreport.com/politics.htm (last visited June 25, 2010).
142 One law scholar recently described the “reality” in these terms:
The truth is that large corporate entities already dominate the conversation. They are
our employers, our suppliers and our service providers. Through the revolving door
of government, their leaders take up key positions in administrative agencies. They
tirelessly lobby elected and appointed officials. They hire legions of attorneys to
bring lawsuits to overturn statutes and regulations that cut into their profits. And, of
course, they spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year on advertising and
marketing to make sure that everyone gets the message.
Adam Benforado, Letter to the Editor, The Power of Money in Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2010, at A18.
143 “If we don’t act quickly, the court’s ruling will have an immediate and disastrous impact
on the 2010 elections,” said Senator Charles E. Schumer, shortly after the Citizens United opinion
was issued. Dan Eggen, Democrats Suggest Ways to Curb Companies’ Campaign Spending,
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/02/11/AR2010021102678.html.
144 See id.
145 See id.; see also Jess Bravin & Brody Mullins, New Rules Proposed On Campaign Donors,
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 12, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033829045750
59941933737002.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines; Kenneth P. Vogel, Dems Try to Blunt
SCOTUS Decision, POLITICO, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/
32839.html.
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not only are exposed to different viewpoints, but they are also aware
that there are alternative positions. As the Justices are well aware,
diversity of opinion is vital to truly democratic elections. Justice
Kennedy writes, “it is inherent in the nature of the political process that
voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order
to determine how to cast their votes.”146 Where Justice Kennedy and
his colleagues in the majority err is with respect to their vision of how to
achieve diversity of voice and perspective.147
In a concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, Justice Breyer determined that the campaign finance context is “a
case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the
legal equation. For that reason there is no place for a strong
presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to
accompany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’”148 The interest referenced is the
protection of a neutral voting environment in which there is reasonable
(if not equal) room for those with viewpoints, but not financial fortunes
to speak and to be heard. Justice Kennedy’s point in Citizens United
that “[s]peakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound
bites, talking points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-hour
news cycle”149 is difficult to reconcile with a firm anti-regulation
approach. The fact that wealthy entities are already versed in the use of
manipulative messaging highlights our need to increase governmental
efforts to counteract this harmful influence. Unfortunately, the Citizens
United decision does more than to give corporate interests a place at the
table.150 It gives them a place at the head of the table and a bullhorn.

146
147

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
Justice Stevens notes, “[a]s we have unanimously observed, legislatures are entitled to
decide ‘that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation’ in an electoral context. Not only has the distinctive potential of corporations to
corrupt the electoral process long been recognized, but within the area of campaign finance,
corporate spending is also ‘furthest from the core of political expression, since corporations’ First
Amendment speech and association interests are derived largely from those of their members and
of the public in receiving information.’” Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing FEC v. Nat’l
Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209–10 (1982) and FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161
n.8 (2003)) (citation and footnote omitted).
148 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
149 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912.
150 Prior to Citizens United, corporations already had many opportunities to communicate and
influence elections in profound and substantial ways.
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